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COMMENTS
OCCUPATIONAL DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN AND

THE LAW
EDITH L. FISCHt

Typical of the usual state anti-discrimination statutes which, either through

design or neglect, fail expressly to Include women within their coverage'

are the New York statutes which deal with discrimination by employers,2

unions, 3 and tax exempt educational institutions.4 Because these statutes forbid
discrimination on the basis of race, creed, color or national originr, but do not

mention sex, no penalities can be imposed under these statutes against an
employer, union, or university that discriminates against women.

Fortunately, the gap left open by these statutes has been partially dosed

by the recent decision of Wilson v. Hacker et al. 0 Here the plaintiff, owner of

a restaurant and tavern employing three women as bartenders, sought an
injunction against the defendant unions who were picketing her premises in

an effort to induce her to enter into a union shop agreement. The dispute arose
from the fact that one of the defendant unions (Bartenders League of America)

refused to accept women as members and the plaintiff refused to enter into a
union shop agreement which would in effect require the discharge of the women

bartenders.
In an unusually well written and far-seeing decision Halpern, J., granted
an injunction, stating:
"Discrimination on the ground of sex, in the absence of any evidence of incompetence or bad moral character in the particular case, must be condemned as
a violation of the fundamental principles of American democracy." 7
It is true that the New York anti-discrimination statutes do not in express
terms forbid discrimination in employment on the grounds of sex, but, as

pointed out by the court, the anti-discrimination principle is not limited to
'I Member of the New York Bar.
1. See, e.g., ILL. REv. STAT. c. 29, § 24C (defense contracts) and c. 38, § 135 (1949)
(accommodations and facilities); N. J. STAT. A.P.. § 18; 25-12 (Supp. 1950) (unlawful

employment practice to discriminate because of race, creed, color, national origin or
ancestry); PA. STAT. Axx. tit. 43, § 153 (Supp. 1950) (discrimination in contracts for
public works-race, color or creed). Cf. CAL. Co.sr. ART. MC' § 18: "No prson sball,
on account of sex, be disqualified from entering upon or pursuing any lawful business,
vocation, or profession."
2. N. Y. Excurivn LAW § 131.
3. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAw § 43; N.Y. E~xcuXvm LAW § 131.
4. N. Y. TAx LAW § 4 (6). See also N. Y. Civ. Riors L.w § 42 (utility companies)
and § 44 (industries involved in defense contracts); N. Y. Lm LAW § 220-c (a) (public
works); N. Y. CoxsT. AR. I § 11 (prohibits discrimination in civil rights on the basis of
race, color, creed or religion).
5. Cf. N.Y. TAx LAw § 4 (6) (which speaks in terms of race, color or religion).
6. 101 N. Y. S. 2d 461 (1950).
7. Id. at 472.
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express statutory provision. Because these statutes merely provide special
procedures and penalties in certain cases it does not follow that "a court may
not condemn such discrimination as a violation of fundamental principle .... Is
The holding of the Wilson case, reflects the gradual reversal of social and
judicial opinion in regard to the legal and economic status of women. As
is well known, the concept that women had the right to engage in any lawful
occupation or profession was contrary to the spirit of the common law.0
The Supreme Court of the United States in 1872 endorsed the common law
view in Bradwell v. The State,10 when it upheld the decision of an Illinois
court that had refused to grant a woman a license to practice law in that state.
In the words of the court:
"The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex
evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life. The constitution of the
family organization, which is founded in the divine ordinance, as well as in the nature
of things, indicates the domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain
and functions of womanhood. The harmony, not to say identity, of interest and
views which belong, or should belong, to the family institution is repugnant to
the idea of a woman adopting a distinct and independent career from that of her
husband....
"The paramount destiny and mission of women are to fulfil the noble and benign
offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator."'"
This point of view, however, received noticeable opposition after the advent
of the twentieth century.' 2 The change in judicial attitude is well illustrated
in State v. McCune"3 where the court declared:
"Women have the same inherent and inalienable rights as men guaranteed to
them under both federal and state Constitution[s]. The constitutional provision that
'All men are by nature free and independent and have certain alienable [Sic inalienable] rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty,
acquiring, possessing and protecting property and seeking and obtaining happiness
and safety,' applies to women the same as men.
"The emancipation of women from her political, industrial and civil fetters has
been a slow, and for her, a difficult process;14 but today the rights of women must
be as fully recognized as the rights of men."
Again, sixty-seven years after the Bradwell case, a Massachusetts court, in
8. Id. at 473.
9. See Crozier, Constitutionality of Discrimination Based on Sex, 15 B. U. L. REv. 723

(1935).
10. 16 Wall. 130 (U. S. 1872).
11. Id. at 141 (concurring opinion).
12. In re Opinion of the Justices, 303 Mass. 631, 22 N. E. 2d 49 (1939) (discrimination
between married and single women barred); State v. McCune, 27 N. P. X. s. 77 (Ohio
1928); People v. Williams, 189 N. Y. 131, 81 N. E. 778 (1907). But cf. People v. Charles
Schweinler Press, 214 N.Y. 395, 108 N.E. 639 (1915).
13. 27 N. P. N. s. 77 (Ohio 1928) (prohibition of employment of women as taxi
drivers held unconstitutional).
14. Id. at 80.
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holding several proposed bills that would disqualify certain women from
public employment unconstitutional, stated:
"Women married or unmarried are members of the State. Subject only to constitutional limitations and valid statutory limitations they share with other citizens
the duties and privileges of citizenship. And like other citizens they are entitled to
the benefit of the constitutional guaranties against arbitrary discrimination ...
It is true of women as of men that 'Every citizen has a like interest in the application of the public wealth to the common good, and the like right to demand that
there be nothing of partiality, nothing of merely selfish favoritism in the administration of the trust.' "15
The excellent service rendered by women, both during and after World
War II in occupations and trades traditionally held by men, including military
service, provided great impetus to the principle of equal rights and after 1945
legislative bodies on the international level10 have indicated that "the right
to education and to choose any profession, occupation or trade, is in itself
the rightful heritage of every human being-man or woman-and should have no
than the extent of the individual's own possibilities and
more limitation
talents.1 17
Recognition of the equality principle appears in Chapter IX, Article 55 of
the United Nations Charter which reads as follows:
"With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are
necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for
the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations
shall promote:
"(c) universal respect for, and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms
for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion." 18
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights declares that everyone without
distinction of any kind, expressly including sex, has the right to free choice
of employment.' 9
It would also seem that the right of a woman to free choice of occupation
is inherent in the Charter of the Organization of American States promulgated
in 1948.20 After proclaiming the fundamental rights of every individual without
distinction of race, nationality, creed or sex the Charter provides that:
"All human beings, without distinction as to race, nationality, sex, creed or social
15. In re Opinion of the Justices, 303 Mass. 631, 645, 22 N.E.2d 49, 59 (1939).
16. U. N. CHARTER, 59 Stat. 1035 et seq. (1945); CmrTra or Onmo.,xIzmro! oF ArimcSTxrs (1948); UNrvwamSAL DECLARATIO OF HumAm Riirrs ArL 2, 23 (1945).
17. PA.'q
AcAmn UNiox, BuLxrtN oF Tim Lrrm A-m.axcc Com'wmo:. or WoMIun4 (1948). On the local level statutes have been enacted prohibiting dicrimination in rate
43, § 375.2
of pay because of sex. See N.Y. LABOR LAW § 199-a; PA. STAT. Amis. tit.
(Supp. 1950).
18. 59 Stat. 1035 et seq. (1945).
19. UTvEasAL DEcLAPATION; or HuAsn Rian-s Art. 2, 23 (1945).
20. CHARTER OF THE ORGANIATIOV or Armcwx.u STATES c. II, Art. 5 (j) (194S).
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condition, have the right to attain material well-being and spiritual growth under
circumstances of liberty, dignity, equality of opportunity, and economic security."21
The Wilson case constitutes another milestone in the steady progress towards
the firm establishment of a fundamental democratic principle-the right to
be free from economic discrimination on class grounds. This case, for the
first time, judicially brings arbitrary discrimination on the basis of sex by
a union 22 into the sphere of prohibited conduct. Of equal significance is the
utilization by the court of the common law theory of prima facie tort which
thereby dispenses with any necessity for statutory relief. The decision, while
focusing attention on the glaring defect in the New York anti-discrimination
statutes in that they fail to mention sex, has 'at the same time succeeded in
carrying out the letter and the spirit of the United Nations Charter and The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights which the United States is morally, if
not legally, committed to follow.It is to be hoped that the widespread adoption of the theory of this case will
soon condemn occupational exclusion on class grounds to obsolescence, preserving it only as an echo from the past.
21. Id., c. VII, Art. 29.
22. Prior cases were all concerned with public or state action. Cases cited note 12 supra.
23. In Fujii v. State, 217 P. 2d 481 (Cal. 1950) several provisions of the United
Nations Charter were used to hold unenforceable a California statute. It thus appears
that the Charter exercises a legal as well as a moral compulsion. See Comment, 20 FoaD. L.
REv. 91 for a discussion of the Fujii case.

